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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TilE ~TATE OF UTAII, 
Plaintiff and UesJHillrlent, 
-vs.- ca~e ~ o. 9920 
.T .\ ~~~~~~ B. DE~X LS, 
Deffndant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
~TA'I'E~II~Xrr OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from a conviction 1n the 
Fourth Di~trict Court, Utah County, of the cri1ne of 
forg-Pry in violation of Section 76-:26-7, r.c.A. 1953. 
DI~PO~ITIOX IX LO\VER COURT 
The appellant pled not guilty to the information 
charging hin1 with the crime of forgery, and upon jury 
trial before the Honorable :Maurice Harding, Judge, on 
March 1:1. 1963, the appellant was found guilty and com-
mitted to the State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT OX APPEAL 
The re~pondent submits the decision of the trial 
court ~hould be affirmed. 
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STATEI\IENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of 
facts as being in keeping with the rule that in reviewing 
a conviction the record will be reviewed in a light most 
favorable to the conviction and, also, being more in keep-
ing with the actual evidence before the jury. 
On or about December 7, 1962, the appellant entered 
Curley's Market in Provo, Utah (R. 7) where he pre-
sented Exhibit 1 to Clayton F. Black, the son of the pro~ 
prietor. (R. 7, 8). Exhibit 1 is an instrument purporting 
to be a cheak drawn upon the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company, Farmers and Merchants Branch, Provo, Utah, 
by Mrs. Billie Stubbs, and payable in the sum of $54.31. 
The check was dated December 7, 1962, and bore the 
notation "Labor." Mr. Black initialed the check, and the 
cashier gave the appellant the money. (R. 8). 
Mrs. Billie Stubbs testified that it was not her 
signature on Exhibit 1, although it bore her name. 
(R. 11, 12). She also testified that she did not give the 
appellant permission or authority to sign her name (R. 
12), nor did she authorize anyone else to sign her name 
to a check for the appellant. (R.13). 
LeGrand J. Barker, Lieutenant of Detectives of the 
Provo Police Department, had conversation with the 
appellant on February 11, 1963. He testified, (R. 15): 
"A. Jimmie came into the Police Department and 
said that Billie Stubbs was going to sign a 
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romplaint, unless he could get the 1noney for 
these checks that he had written, before the 
bank opened that Inorning, and he gave me a 
statement regarding this check. 
Q. I am speaking of this particular check, l\Ir. 
Baker, the check which is Fifty-four Dollars 
and son1e odd cents drawn on the Walker 
Bank. 
Did he 1nake any comment regarding that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. \Yhat did he say regarding that? 
A. HP said that he had made out the check and 
signed the name of Mrs. Billie Stubbs. 
Q. Did he say anything else regarding it? 
A. That he didn't have authority from her to 
sign the check." 
The appellant, upon voluntarily taking the stand,. 
tP~tified that on December 8, 1963, he signed Mrs. Billie 
~tubbs' name on the ~heck, Exhibit 1, which he cashed 
at Curley's :Jiarket. (R. 16, 18). He never made any claim 
that he had authority to sign checks, or that he expected 
the check to be allowed by Mrs. Stubbs. Mrs. Stubbs 
never indicated that she gave the appellant authority to 
sign her name, in fact, she testified to the exact opposite. 
(R.l2). 
Xo other evidence of any kind tending to exculpate 
the aceused was offered. 
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ARGU:MENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW A 
JURY TO CONVICT THE APPELLANT BEYOND ALL 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The appellant was convicted of the crime of forgery, 
and contends the evidence in support of his conviction 
is insufficient. The appellants raises several inferences 
to support his contention. First, he contends that no 
complaint or objection from Mrs. Stubbs to the signing 
of the check by the appellant was made after the fact 
until the complaint was signed in February. This is 
after the fact and immaterial. The time when Mrs. 
Stubbs received notice of the check having been forged 
does not appear of record.1 Additionally, there is no 
evidence of record that ~Irs. Stubbs did "ratify" the 
defendant's action, or did or intended to do any of the 
things that appellant sets out in his brief. 
The evidence which actually does appear of record 
is that the appellant made out Exhibit 1, and did so 
without the authority of Mrs. Billie Stubbs, whose name 
he affixed to the check as drawer; that he cashed the 
check, that he offered no excuse or evidence of any past 
conduct that would allow him to expect that his employer 
would have sanctioned such conduct. No evidence of 
record appears that she did sanction the conduct. Finally, 
the appellant admitted the act, and admitted the absence 
1. No evidence of record supports the appellant's assertion 
that the check was received in January, even so one months' 
time between return and the filing of the complaint in February 
is relatively fast action. 
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of uny authority at the tiine of the ad which would allow 
his ad ions or ta('itly give t ht>m approval. A mere hope 
of :-;uhsPtpa·nt ratification is insufficient to exculpate. 
'ftwrP is no evidence that the appellant thought he had 
nutho ri t y to sign his e1nployer's nmne to a check in his 
be halt', or had in the past been given any reason that 
would lead hiin so to believe. The actual evidence of 
record is ru:nply sufficient to convict. 
Jn 0tatc r. T.inuin, 64 Utah 579, 232 Pac. 543 (1925), 
the P\·idt-nep showed a silnilar course of conduct, but 
without the direct admissions of the defendant. The 
court held the evidence to be amply sufficient to sustain 
n conviction. The evidence is, therefore, amply sufficient 
in this case . 
. \s to the appellant's claim of ratification, he has 
no legal basis for his contention. The general rule is 
found in Clark and 1\Iarshall Crimes, 6th Ed., Sec. 12.32 : 
"To constitute forgery, a fraudulent intent 
is ahn1ys essential. There must not only be a false 
making of an instrument, but it must be with in-
tent to defraud. It follows that a person is not 
guilty of forgery in signing another's name to a 
note or other instrument, if he believes that he has 
authority to do so, though he may in fact have no 
authority. If there is no such authority, however, 
and no belief that there is, one who signs an-
other's nmne to an instrument is none the less 
guilty of forgery because he believes that the per-
son whose name he signs will ratify his act and 
pay the obligation. * * *" 
The appellant did not ever indicate that he thought 
he had authority to execute the check, in fact he admit-
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ted to the contrary. There was not one scintilla of evi-
dence that appellant had a "reasonable and honest" 
belief that he had authority to execute the instrument. 
Nor would subsequent hope of ratification obviate the 
offense, or even subsequent ratification had that occur-
red. Tho1nas v. State, 33 S.\V. 127 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1895). In State v. Tull, 119 Mo. 421, 24 S.W. 1010 (1893), 
the court stated the general rule : 
"The fact that one whose name had been 
forged may be willing to condone the offense, and 
even pay the obligation, does not render it less a 
cri1ne in the forger." 
See also People v. Weaver, 177 N.Y. 434, 69 N.E. 
1094 ( 1904), where a claim similar to the instant one was 
rejected by the New Y ol'lk Court of Appeals on the 
grounds that mere hope of ratification does not destroy 
the necessary intent to defraud. Of a similar conclusion 
is Foster v. St,ate, 65 Tex. Cr. 143, 143 S.\V. 623 (1912). 
vVharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 437, 
notes: 
"It is no defense that the accused believed 
that the person whose name he had forged to 
the instrument would pay the amount thereof, or 
that there was condonation by subsequent ratifi-
cation and willingness to pay, on the part of the 
person whose name was forged, or intent to re-
pay, or actual repayment, or ratification of the 
instrument." 
See also 37 C.J.S., Forgery, Sec. 89. 
Consequently, there is no merit to appellant's con-
tention as to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
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POINT II. 
THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ORDER A MISTRIAL AFTER APPELLANT'S OPENING 
ARGUMENT. 
Tlw appellant's second point urges that the actions 
of tlw trial defense counsel in making his opening argu-
ment to the jury Wl're so prejudicial to the accused that 
the tr.ial court should have sua sponte granted a mistrial. 
Tlw opening argument of the defense counsel was a short 
response to the proof the prosecution outlined in its 
opening argument. The opening statement of the de-
fense, which appellant now, for the first time on appeal 
finds objectionable, was as follows in its pertinent parts, 
(R. 5): 
~'Now, the defendant will be called to testify, 
and he will admit that he did. He will say that he 
did. He signed a confession that he did, but he 
didn't. He didn't put that name on that check; he 
didn't forge it. And I want you to watch him very 
carefully when he testifies and says that he did. 
Now the prosecution will ask the defendant if 
he has ever been convicted of a felony-and this is 
a felony-and he will answer yes, that he had. The 
prosecution will ask him that question to show 
that his testimony is unworthy of belief, that you 
can't believe him as to whether or not he is testify-
ing to the truth, because he has already committed 
a serious crime. And under our law the Court will 
instruct you that you can disregard his testimony 
if you don't believe he is telling the truth, because 
he has been eonvicted of a felony once, and this 
casts a cloud upon his ability to tell the truth. 
X ow, this is the substance of our case. The de-
fendant didn't hire me to represent him to plead 
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not guilty. The defendant doesn't want this trial· 
he wanted to plead guilty to this charge. He ha~ 
already admitted to the police that he is guilty to 
this charge, and he is going to tell you that he is 
guilty. But he is not guilty. And I want you to 
watch him when he testifies, because he didn't do 
it. He didn't forge that check. That is our case." 
The argument in no way discloses any disloyalty or 
conflicting motives on the part of defense counsel. He 
insists in the innocence of his client. Although he admits 
that the evidence will disclose a confession of guilt, he, 
in good concience, urges the jury to find his client inno-
cent. 
The appellant's argument is, in effect, that the trial 
defense counsel was guilty of such misconduct as would 
compel the trial judge to order a new trial. Essentially 
the argument of appellant is based on two occurrences 
in the opening argument. First, the fact that he, defense 
counsel, mentioned the appellant's previous conviction, 
and, second, that he commented on his client's confession 
of guilt and feelings of guilt. 
The general rule as to when a conviction is improper 
because of impropriety on the part of the defense counsel 
is set out in 74 ALR 2d 1403: 
"* * * most courts considering * * * the ques-
tion of incompetency of retained counsel are gen-
erally agreed that the judgment of conviction 
is void when counsel's representation has been so 
inadequate as to make the trial a farce and 
1nockery of justice, thereby denying the accused 
a fair trial (due process of law)***." 
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ThP :\t>vada Supreme Court :-;tatPd it a:; follows in 
,'-.'lttte v. J11kl'ch. 49 ~Pv. :217, :2-±:2 Pac. 590 (19:26): 
.. \Ve think that the rule deducible frmn the 
('a~P~ is that a new trial should not be granted 
hy an appellate court in a criminal case on account 
of the i twom pt>h .. 'IH'~r or neglect of counsel, unless 
it i:-; so gn'at that the defendant is prejudiced and 
thereby deprived of a fair trial." 
Thus the trial n1ust be of such a low character as to 
rPnder the trial a "farce and a mockery." People v. 
Durpee, 156 Cal. App .. 2d 60, 319 P.2d 39. 
It is submitted that the defense in this instance, 
although some may say it could have been done better, 
was not a "mockery of justice" so as to warrant reversal. 
See Annotations 24 ALR 1022 ; 64 ALR 437. 
In State v. Farnsworth, 13 U.2d 103, 368 P.2d 914 
(1962), this court was faced with similar claim of im-
proper defense. It noted: 
"'Vith respect to the first alleged error, de-
fendant argues that his trial counsel was incompe-
tent and did not effectively represent him, thus 
depriving him of the right to counsel guaranteed 
by the State and Federal Constitutions. Const. 
art. 1, § 1:2; U.S. Const. Amend. 14. To support 
such a eontention, he cites the facts that trial 
counsPl waived preliminary hearing, ·waived a 
jury, made no opening statement, failed to make 
objections to introduction of evidence, did not 
cross-examine but one of the State's witnesses, 
ete. The privilege of an accused to the assistance 
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of counsel is a fundamental right which means a 
right to a reputable n1ember of the bar who is 
willing and in a position to honestly and conscien-
tiously represent his interests. 
In the instant case, the defendant selected 
and retained the trial counsel \Yho is a member of 
long standing of the bar, experienced in trial 
work, both civil and criminal, and esteemed bv the 
bar and judiciary alike for his ability and in-
tegrity. The serious charges in respect to this 
attorney's competency should not be lightly treat-
ed. Suffice it to say, we have examined the record 
closely and cannot say, upon retrospect, that trial 
counsel did not, under the circumstances of the 
case against the defendant, fairly and competent-
ly represent him. The record indicates that no ac-
tion or inaetion by the trial attorney which could 
not rationally find explanation in a legitimate 
exercise of strategy-particularly when the case 
was tried before a judge wi~thout a jury." 
The factual situation in Farnsworth is certainly 
more aggravated than that in the instant case. Mere 
errors of judgment on the part of defense counsel are 
not sufficient to warran~t reversal because of trial error. 
llfandell v. People, 76 Colo. 296, 231 Pac. 199 (1924); 
Meaders v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 437, 278 S.\Y. 215 
(1925); 7-± ALR 2d 1399. Indeed, that is all the appel-
late counsel, in substance, offers, that if he had tried 
the case below he would have proceeded differently. In 
his brief, appellant urges a plea of guilty should have 
been entered. (Brief, p. 19). This would not have ef-
fected the ultimate result of conviction. An analysis of 
the claims of in1proper action attendant to the opening 
10 
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urgmnent demonstrates only that trial counsel was ein-
ploying good strategy and proper ethics . 
. \ppellant's contention that it was improper for de-
fen:-;p counsel to 1nention the previous felony conviction 
i:-; at best a make-weight argmnent. The appellant in-
tended to ta:ke the stand and defense counsel obviously 
knew that if he did so he would be subject to cross-
examination as to any previous felony convictions, in-
cluding the type and nu1nber. State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d 
"· 361 P.:2d ±12 (1961); State v. Kazda, 1± U.2d ------, 382 
P.:2d 407 (1963). 2 Rather than leave this disclosure to 
the cross-examination of the prosecutor with its telling 
eff{\et, it is good trial strategy to bring the matter out on 
din•et examination or opening argu1nent. This acquaints 
the jury with the faet and allows them to adjust to it 
before the presentation of defendant's case. Further, it 
reliPn's the appearance that something is being held 
hack. Rothblatt, Successful Techniques in the Trial of 
Criminal Cases, p. 8±, so recommends: 
"If your client has a criminal record includ-
mg a conviction or a number of convictions, it 
2. State v. Kazda, supra: "Also assigned as error in the 
cross-examination of the defendant as to prior convictions. It 
was elicited upon cross-examination that the defendant had 
several prior felony convictions, unrelated to the instant charge, 
and he maintains that this amounted to a general assault upon 
his character and thus constituted prejudicia1 error. This is 
also without merit. When an accused voluntarily takes the wit-
ness stand he may be asked whether or not he has ever been 
convicted of a felony. Such a question is sanctioned by statute. 
If the accused answers in the affirmative, he may be asked the 
nature of the felony. Further, the accused may be asked if he 
has been convicted of more than one felony, and if so, the type 
or nature thereof." 
11 
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will sound Inuch better if he tells about it himself 
in the direct examination. This takes the sting out 
of it and prevents the prosecutor from bringing 
it out-it sounds much worse coming from his 
mouth on cross-examination. Such an open ap-
proach also gives you the opportunity to excuse or 
explain it in the most satisfactory way. * * *" 
In Levin, Evidence, 1961 .Annual Survey of .American 
Law, p. 502,517 (1962), it is noted: 
".A prosecutor who is obliged to offer a wit-
ness with an unhappy criminal record may con-
sider it good tactics to anticipate the inevitable 
attack and himself elicit from the witness the 
evidence of prior convictions. Superficially this 
may be characterized as an attempt to impeach 
one's own witness. ***" 
In State v. Holley, 34 N.J. 9, 166 .A.2d 758, cert. de-
nied 368 U.S. 854 (1961), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recognized this as good trial strategy and upheld it 
against an argument that it is an attempt to impeach 
one's own witness. It was, therefore, good and proper 
strategy for defenese counsel to bring this before the 
jury,3 and no claim of error or impropriety can be found 
from such action. 
Finally, the appellant urges that it was improper 
for the trial defense counsel to indicate to the jury that 
3. See State v. Cude, No. 9619, Ju'ly 2, 1963, where the same 
thing was done by trial defense counsel and the prosecutor 
thereafter cross-examined on the nature and number of the 
convictions (appellant's Brief). The court said: "We find no 
merit to defendant's assignment of error relating to the cross-
examination with respect to his felony record." 
12 
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tlw appellant ('On~idered himself guilty, and that he had 
(·ont'"~~l'd to the <'l'iine, and that the prosecution would 
pn·:-;Pnt Pvidence showing that he signed his e1nployer's 
rutmP to Exhibit 1 without proper authority. In this 
rP~lK'rt defpnse coun:-;el \nts doing no more than putting 
before tlw jury the same thing which the prosecution 
hnd indicated would be proved, but he did so with the 
additional qualifieation and assertion that he did not 
l)(llit>VP the defendant was guilty or that he had executed 
t•:xh.ibit 1. He professed faith in the defendant's inno-
Cl'IH'l' and, therefore, left with the jury a doubt as to 
wht>ther they were receiving the full picture in the case. 
Det'Pn~P counsel cannot be expected to lie to the jury or 
to raise issues of defense which are not legally and ethic-
ally proper. When presented with a case of an accused's 
guilt whieh seems to be supported by overwhelming evi-
lh'n<'e, including a confession, defense counsel has little 
altPrnative but to ask the jury to watch the demeanor of 
the accused and to weigh the circumstances carefully 
in their minds. There is no duty on the part of defense 
counsel to plead a man guilty, especially where he has an 
abiding faith in his innocence or feels that the true facts 
of the case are being kept from him. Even if the evidence 
i~ overwhelming, an accused has a right to test the prose-
cution in its proof. That right includes the prerogative 
of ~itting baek and offering no affirmative defense where 
none is available and testing the strength of the prose-
cution'8 case. 
In Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (1955), 
tl1e court was faced with the claim of incompetent de-
fense counsel. In rejecting the contention, the court 
13 
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took note of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. In 
doing so it said: 
"* * * However, when the question of in-
competency of counsel is called into question hv 
the petitioner, the question of guilt must be co~­
sidered by us for the reason that if defendant 
was conelusively guilty the question as to just 
what his counsel could do by way of defense is im-
portant." 
Certainly defense counsel could not be expected to manu-
facture evidence, place perjury before the jury, or induce 
his client to say what his client was unwilling to say. 
Ccmsequently, defense counsel could do nothing but at-
tempt to take the sting of the prosecution's evidence out 
of the minds of the jury and the court and see that the 
evidence was sufficient to prove the crime charged. 
In the instant case, the defense counsel cross-exam-
ined prosecution witnesses as to the identity of the de-
fendant and endeavored to elicit evidence, although in-
admissible, as to the opinion of the appellant's employer 
as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. There 
is nothing in the record, including the opening statement 
of defense counsel, that even approximates infidelity to 
his client, let alone amounting to a sham or mockery of 
justice. Consequently, there can he no claim that de-
fense counsel's conduct entitles the appellant to a new 
trial. People v. Durpee, 156 Cal. App. 2d 60, 319 P.2d 39. 
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CONCLUSION 
It i~ submitted that the guilt of the appellant was 
proved in the trial court by overwhelming evidence. To 
afford the appellant a new trial in the face of arguments 
which, though ingenious, are unmeritorious, would waste 
the time of the courts, the appellant and the prosooutors 
and add nothing to justice. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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